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ABSTRACT 
This paper revises how the expansión of analysis beyond the classic perceptual facet 
crea tes problems in narratological models of focalization. The difficulties in maintaining 
the original ideáis of "grammatical" objectivity and typological neatness are illustrated 
by the comparatively more problematic (or less satisfactory) reductiveness of the attempts 
to implement psychological distinctions. The possibility of applying Fowler's "mind-
style" and Lindemann's "mindscape", as well as more sophisticated typologies using 
modality (Simpson's and DolezePs) are discussed. The analytical problems raised are 
illustrated by a methodologically oriented study of a story by Graham Greene ("I Spy"). 
We have been given classifications and descriptions which leave us wondering why 
we have bothered to classify and describe (Booth Distance 60) 
Introducing one's incursions into áreas of inquiry about which such skeptical attitude was 
expressed so long ago (even before Genette!) is, understandably enough, an arduous task, 
because of the pervading feeling of stagnation and the many conventional requirements 
that have to be met. In the field of point of view, for instance, three commentaries or tasks 
have become standard: one is expected (a) to specify and organise the lexical variants of 
the concept; (b) then to laboriously disentangle the plethora of roughly-equivalent-yet-
different-and-leading-to-confusion distinctions that have been developed, and to denounce 
the undesirable effects of this situation (Genette Figuras III, Nouveau Discours. Bal. 
Fowler Linguistics and the Novel, Linguistic Criticism; Chatman Story and Discourse, 
64 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
Characters and Narrators. Rimmon-Kenan. Toolan. Simpson); (c) finally, to propose 
some "theoretical refinements" (Nelles 365), since internal contradictions have been 
detected or because the specific problems posed by a particular text cannot be solved. In 
this context of continuous reworking and uncertain progress it is not striking to read, for 
instance, that "a major revisión is in order" (Edmiston 729), or to find a list of nine recent 
refinements of Genette's focalization and still the claim that "most of these critics have 
misanalyzed certain key aspects of Genette's original conception of focalization and that 
as a result their discussions are based on, and sometimes compromised by, a set of false 
premises about it" (Nelles 365). Genette himself perceived the provisional quality of his 
findings (FigurasIII322); however, to accept an evolutionary conception of any discipline 
is not as serious as the tensions caused in models by refinements and expansions, which 
opérate in two directions: "improvements" shake the basic tenets of the área of inquiry to 
which they are applied, but the interests of the área of inquiry also condition the 
application of those improvements (perhaps even to the point of distortion). 
These issues will occupy me: 1) The study will show the tensions inflicted on 
narratological models by the contraction of point of view into focalization, and the more 
recent expansión of typological efforts towards psychological ingredients.1 2) I will 
illustrate the former with a revisión of some attempts at integrating modality in point of 
view on the psychological plañe. 3) These attempts to develop complementary insights 
will be practically assessed (or rather illustrated) with a particular application; that is, with 
their ability to cope with Graham Greene's use of point of view in a short (just over 1,100 
words) masterpiece entitled "I Spy." Recalling Booth's opening words, "classifications and 
descriptions" will be constantly defeated by Greene's story, but Greene's "victory" will 
be best observed with the help of those tools.2 
1. Changes of Ñame and Size: Continuing Conflicts. 
As the title advances in a slightly cryptic way, I will argüe that the terminological "point 
of view/focalization" debate and the incorporation of discriminations of several facets have 
stimulated the continuity of some theoretical conflicts and problems already present, but 
less evident, in original formulations. The specific problem to concéntrate on is the 
treatment of the psychological facet in perception-oriented studies on focalization. 
1.1 "Point of view" or "focalization"? These are obviously not the only ÑAMES available: 
the dichotomy sanctions the existence of two major traditions — Anglo-American studies 
on "point of view" (Friedman) and Genette's narratological category of "focalization" 
(Figuras III). Genette's coinage is intended to discriminate between two aspects 
assimilated in the American scene: perspective ("who sees?," the imaginary "position" that 
determines how/what events are perceived) and narration ("who speaks?," the "identity" 
of the telling voice, which does not necessarily coincide with the identity of the agent 
whose position has been chosen to select information). Thus the two traditions depend on 
the will to assimilate or distinguish the categories of mode and voice.3 Genette's original 
intervention has been very influential, but not passively followed: 
a) A technical problem is the persistence of some degree of heterogeneity in Genette's 
list of types of focalization — zero or non-focalized, internal, external — a distinction 
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precisely justified by Genette for its homogeneity: "Genette's classification is based on 
two different criteria: while the distinction between non-focalized and internally focalized 
refers to the position of the perceiver (the focalizer), that between internally focalized and 
extemally focalized refers to the perceived object" (Rimmon-Kenan 139). 
b) The figure of the focalizer derives from Mieke Bal's revisión of Genette's theory. 
Her revisión is also made in the ñame of homogeneity, because it seeks to more decisively 
distinguish between the "who speaks?" and "who sees?" sides of the traditional notion of 
point of view by exploring the two logical positions in any process of focalization — 
focalizer/focalized. Another necessary step in the institution of the category of focalization 
is the separation of the level of story (in which the focalizer is situated) from that of the 
text (in which the narrator appears). But apart from these figures we have still to decide 
what to do with authors (both implied and real): according to Bal's opponents (and this 
includes Genette's revisión oíNouveau Discours) it is difficult to justify the focalizer, a 
"theoretical middle ground between the narrator and the actor.... There is no advantage to 
eliminating the implied author in order to give its functions to the newly created focalizer" 
(Nelles 372-3).4 
c) Critics are always expected to explain their choice of new ñames for the concepts 
they develop. In the case of focalization Genette has been preoccupied with the "optical-
photographic connotations" of point of view, and with the uncertain persistence of the 
connotation despite his choice of the comparatively more abstract focalization (Genette 
Figuras III244, Rimmon-Kenan 71). For instance, Chatman thinks that 
Genette has always seemed to mean more by focalisation than the mere power of sight. 
He obviously refers to the whole spectrum of perception: hearing, tasting, smelling, and 
so on. What is not so clear is the extent to which he means it to refer to other mental 
activity, like cognition, and to functions other than mental" (Chatman Characters and 
Narrators 192). And further evidence is provided by Toolan, whose alternative proposal 
shows his concern with a restrictive treatment of the concept: "I do think orientation is 
a usefully wider, less visual, term than focalization, and would help us to remember that 
'cognitive, emotive and ideological' perspectives, in addition to the simply spatiotemporal 
one, may be articulated by a narrative's chosen focalization" (68). The "undesirable" 
association of focalization with a visual dimensión is partly Bal's responsibility, who 
defends focalization as a technical category "used in photography and film" (102); 
besides, her "perceptual slant" (Deleyto 160) is undeniable. This approach has been 
criticized, because it reveáis a "predisposition to read the text as if it were a sequence of 
camera shots in a film" (Nelles 375). 
The three intersecting problems I have revised could be easily related to two 
contradictory aspirations of narrative theory —to créate theoretical distinctions and to 
explain each category as self-consistent, independent, and complete. Genette original 
distinction is only incompletely realized, as it still combines different phenomena— the 
"angle(s) of seeing" in relation to the fictional world, the object "seen" (both objects and 
people), and the consciousness that "sees"; the problems of Bal's focalization are 
comparable because the theoretical layer stipulated for focalization —story— can only 
apparently be grasped as independent from other facets which constitute the complex 
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phenomenon of narrative mediacy: "identity and non-identity of the realism of the fictional 
characters and of the narrator (first-Ahird-person narration); internal and external 
perspective (limited point of view/omniscience); teller-character and reflector-character 
as agents of transmission (telling/showing)" (Stanzel Teller-Characters 5). 
However, I would like to explore a more restricted side of the problem: the notion of 
perception represents the history of focalization, as attempts to transcend a simplistic, 
purely visual interpretation of perception (the movement towards "conception") have led 
to the loss of typological neatness of models of focalization. Bal's rejection of a visual 
sense of perception illustrates both the movement and the induced uncertainty: "Perception 
... is a psychological process, strongly dependent on the position of the perceiving body; 
a small child sees things in a totally different way from an adult, if only as far as 
measurements are concerned. The degree to which one is familiar with what one sees also 
influences perception.... Perception depends on so many factors that striving for objectivity 
is pointless" (100). There is in this commentary an interesting blend of "objective" 
references to observational-physical-visual details and assumptions about mental processes 
derived from them, about how things are "seen" in a deep sense.5 But Bal's vindication of 
perception as also made of psychological factors is not the only one identified by critics 
and attributed to focalization, because others have added an ideological dimensión, and to 
complícate things a bit, similar expansions have been assigned to the apparently rejected 
notion of point of view from the área of Critical Linguistics. In general terms there is broad 
agreement on a three-term scheme —spatiotemporal, psychological, ideological— but it has 
given rise to interesting variations: Fowler (Linguistics and the Novel 76) describes two 
classes —perspective and attitude—, apparently equivalent to Mieke Bal's physical and 
psychological (101) points of perception. ChdAman's perceptual and conceptual are also 
comparable, but he adds an heterogeneous interest (Story and Discourse).6 Uspensky's 
three levéis are further distinguished in Toolan's previous commentary, which follows 
Rimmon-Kenan (79-82) in representing the cognitive and the emotive as two branches of 
the psychological facet: this leaves four kinds, or even five, if we consider how space and 
time are ruled differently (Rimmon-Kenan 77-9. Fowler Linguistic Criticism. Simpson). 
To sum up:7 
Uspensky 
Fowler 1986 
Simpson 
Rimmon-Kenan 
Chatman 1978 
Fowler 1977 
Bal 
spatiotemporal 
perceptual 
perceptual 
perspective 
psychological 
emotive cognitive 
ideological 
ideological 
conceptual 
attitude 
perspective / focalization / perception 
physical psychological 
interest 
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1.2 The chart reveáis that these critics are not faced with a merely lexical issue, but with 
the SIZE of focalization, with the borders of focalization and the meaning of perception: 
although we are constantly reminded that "perception must be understood in such a sense 
that it may include an agent's world view (ideology, conceptual system, Weltanschauung, 
etc.)" (Deleyto 161), the perceptual facet tends to be identified with perspective (in a 
sensory sense) and with the spatiotemporal dimensión, and opposed to conception, attitude, 
the psychological, emotive, cognitive, ideological, etc.. Therefore the ingredients of Bal's 
"conceptualized" perception are generally distinguished, and the perceptual sticks to a 
"visual," factual sense. 
One factor to consider is that some of these critics are working with facets of "point 
of view," and others with facets of focalization, which is a more restricted category in a 
different theoretical frame. How does this affect the grasping of the contents of perception 
and the feasibility of the extensión of the typological methods of narratological research 
in the spatiotemporal dimensión of focalization to more "subjective" áreas? Perhaps the 
simplification of focalization, its restriction to perception in strict sensory bounds could 
be a good methodological strategy, because it would elimínate some analytical difficulties 
involved in assimilating the psychological component of perception in focalization. In 
order to decide on the necessity of that strategy we should revise the practice and methods 
of narratology. In section 1.2.11 will comment on the tendency of narratological studies 
to impose an overarching distinction between the internal and the external on all facets 
(Rimmon-Kenan 75-7), and on its superior effectiveness when its classifications have been 
restricted to the spatiotemporal facet and to the perceptual factor. In section 1.2.2 I will 
describe the selective appropriation of the psychological and ideological facets, and its 
treatment of subjectivity and interiorization. 
1.2.1 The paradoxical objectivity of the spatiotemporal dimensión. 
The spatiotemporal dimensión, connected with the perceptual in its most physical sense, 
has been left in a paradoxical position. It has the strength of its "self-explanatory" quality 
(Simpson 11), and deictic examples are usually preferred to ¡Ilústrate focalization, not only 
because the existence of verbal indications of proximity or situation is more objectively 
observed than the other dimensions, but also because theoretically it lends itself to less 
confusión: the constituents of the focalizer's sensory range can be more easily 
discriminated than those of its mind and emotions. It is easier to decide what could have 
been seen or heard by a character than to determine (or measure) to what extent 
information has been processed by his/her mind, or to what extent another superimposed 
focalization (the narrator's) intervenes. In this sense, when the question "who sees?" has 
been enlarged to mean "who thinks?," "who feels?," "who evalúales?," "who interprets?," 
etc., elucidation has become extremely complicated, since visión and mental attitude, the 
ingredients of "extended" focalization, can be attributed to different simultaneous 
focalizers, in much the same way as the voice of narration can be combined with a 
different source of visión. 
A good example is precisely provided by Bal's treatment of the "who speaks?"/"who 
sees?" distinction. The idea that one person can tell a story from another person's visión 
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is illustrated with a sentence from Henry James' The Ambassadors ("Elizabeth saw him 
lie there, palé and lost in thought"). Bal claims that it is ridiculous to think that the second 
part is narrated by Elizabeth: "What this sentence does is to present Elizabeth's visión 
clearly: after all, she does see him lying down" (101). All right, it is clear that she "saw 
him" and that she is not narrating the second part, but it is clear that the "saw him" part 
has a different quality of obviousness (and that is why it is emphasised by Bal!) from the 
relatively more problematic issue of the source of the evaluation of his state ("palé and lost 
in thought"), which implies psychological activity and subjectivity. It is true that these 
commentaries can be very easily attributed to the focalizer and "perceived" in the 
focalized, because of their comparatively visual quality. However, we could imagine the 
effects concerning determination in terms of the internal/ external opposition (so dear to 
narratologists) of the substitution of "palé and lost in thought" with, for instance, "bored 
and irritated": these adjectives imply a greater deal of interpretation, and more decisively 
allow for the possible existence of an external focalizer or subjectivity malcing this 
interpretation or "shaping" Elizabeth's observations.8 
Other technical and practical sides of the problem can be signalled: we can explicitly 
apply it to the theoretical level —story— to which focalization is ascribed by Bal. In this 
respect a serious technical problem is how mental activities or ideological positions can 
be described at the intermedíate level of story and attributed to a focalizer without being 
conditioned by the fact that they are grasped through the level of the text, that the 
narrator's language may convey a different "mind" from the focalizer's own: "It is almost 
impossible to speak without betraying some personal 'point of view', if only through the 
very language used" (Rimmon-Kenan 72). This problem is more serious "when the 
focalized is also human, his own subjectivity is no less relevant than that of the focalizer" 
(Rimmon-Kenan 80). A third, more practical contradiction arises from the contrast 
between focalization as a more or less distinct theoretical possibility and normal creative 
practice, which reveáis the diversity of factors confusingly assimilated: "lo que llamamos 
focalización interna raras veces se aplica de forma rigurosa. En efecto, el propio principio 
de ese modo narrativo entraña en rigor que el personaje focal no aparezca descrito jamás 
ni designado desde el exterior, y que el narrador no analice objetivamente sus 
pensamientos ni percepciones.... La focalización interna no se realiza plenamente sino en 
el relato en 'monólogo interior'" (Genette Figuras III 247). It is evident that, strictly 
speaking, the typological possibility called "internal focalization" involves several 
different phenomena, that the postulation of a single label and then the unwilling 
concession that narrators have naturally to depart from this internal position is 
contradictory, because at least two kinds of internal focalization should be identified: the 
choice of a character as a deictic centre, and access to the character's mind. To these a 
third kind of "internal" method can be identified, but this belongs to the level of narration, 
and has to be disentangled from focalization proper —i.e., to nárrate by copying his/her 
thoughts or using a combined or external method (the possibility of "copying" the 
character's language belongs to this level). Let us simply remember Bal's remark: 
"Perception depends on so many factors that striving for objectivity is pointless" (100). 
The paradox of the spatiotemporal facet of focalization lies in the contrast between the 
methodological appeal of its objective distinctions and its inevitable "imperfect" imitation 
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when it is applied to explain the "superior" facets of psychological and ideological 
focalization, those that exhibit subjectivity. In the following subsection I will revise two 
theoretical notions associated to focalization in the psychological and ideological facets. 
1.2.2 Psychological Mindscapes and Ideological Mind-styles: Difficult Applications. 
Psychological focalization is typically approached in an "objective" way, which reveáis 
a tendency to assume that cognition means "amount of information": Focalization literally 
addresses matters of cognition alone.... The only question to be resolved in the 
determination of focalization is how much the narrator tells the narratee about the story in 
relation to the characters' knowledge about the story " (Nelles 366. Italics mine). Obvious 
problems are apparent if we consider this statement: cognition also involves the processing 
of events, but this psychological área has to be left aside, since it requires analytical tools 
narratology is perhaps not prepared to implement, or psychology to provide. What is 
offered, instead, is a grammaticized versión of the psychological phenomena narrated 
involved in narrative, one in which all the strength is attributed to the external-internal 
dichotomy: " 
In cognitive terms, the external-internal opposition becomes one between unrestricted and 
restricted knowledge. In emotive terms, it distinguishes between attitudes that are 
objective, neutral or uninvolved, on the one hand, and attitudes that are subjective or 
involved, on the other. All these facets pertain only to the focalizer" (Edmiston 736).9 
This treatment of the psychological plañe is a local manifestation of a general 
"syntactic" tendency of narratological studies: the main consequence of the narratological 
concern with the articulation of the "narrating" on the "narrated" in the field of 
focalization is the generation of typologies that determine the implicit manipulation of the 
"fábula" as detected in the "story" layer. The reductiveness of the narratological approach 
to the psychological facet could be overeóme with the implementation of findings derived 
from the área of psychology, since the structure of mental processes can affect the 
structure of focalized narratives. This is attempted, for instance, by Lindemann's 
mindscapes: on the evidence of a narrative text with constant shifts of interior monologues 
not announced by any narrator, he imagines a hypothetical notion of mindscape, "a 
particular landscape of knowledge" (205) or cognitive system organizing perception of the 
world. Lindemann suggests that each mindscape has three kinds of elements: a) those 
activated by knowledge, b) those derived from the "webs of connections that hold among 
knowledge items", and c) "the particular array of inferences and presuppositions ... valid 
against the background of a) and b)" (193-4). Lindemann's proposals ere too provisional 
and dependent on a concrete text, but the gap between psychology and literary studies is 
bridged, since they are formulated with a pragmatic-linguistic orientation. He shows a 
strong interest in the systematic formal procedures involved: "presuppositions and the 
related concepts of entailment, implication, implicature are grammatical contrivances to 
implement a mindscape in an actual text surface" (204). 
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Cognitive psychology itself could play a decisive role in the study of focal ization. 
Theoretically speaking, we should rely on the research done by psychologists to describe 
the psychological facet of point of view, to increase the amount of information about the 
mental processing of events by focalizers, and the proper analysis of the elements signalled 
above would require a very high standard of competence in psychological research. 
However, this higher degree of competence has not been reached in the prominent 
interdisciplinary work carried out so far.10 There is a significant breach between the goals 
of psychologists dealing with the cognitive aspects of literary narratives and the analysis 
of cognitive processes proposed by Lindemann to elucídate textual mindscapes, because 
in the former the cognitive "factor" is primarily located in the "external" domain of readers 
who experience literary texts. The cognitive phenomena examined are, for instance, 
processes of activation of "working memory" or "long-term memory," "on-line" and "off-
line" inferences, etc., and the emphasis is sometimes severely quantitative ("statistical 
readers," "potency" of interpretation understood as popularity in numerical terms, 
proposed tasks as measuring literary effects, etc. Dixon etal.). As can be inferred from the 
previous parameters the vein of these studies is segregationist, because literariness is still 
essentially attributed to texts, and opposed to "unlíterariness." Literariness of narratives 
is naively identified with notions as "depth of appreciation," i.e. the degree of 
improvement of one's opinión of a text after a second reading (Dixon et al. 17). For 
instance, the relevance of this kind of work can be illustrated with Keith Millis' study on 
the issue of "perspective": the basic concept —"deictic center" (Bruder et al.)— derives 
from well-known distinctions in narrative studies: 
The deictic center is the convergence of spatial (WHERE), temporal (WHEN) and 
character (WHO) information at any point within the narrative. WHO refers to the 
character that is in current focus.... Bruder et al. distinguish between two types of WHO: 
the focal WHO and the focalizing WHO. The focal WHO is the character that the reader 
tracks in space and in time, whereas the focalizing WHO is the agent of a character's 
experience. The focal WHO would roughly correspond to an external perspective, 
whereas the focalizing WHO would roughly correspond to an internal perspective. 
(Millis 238-9) 
However, the critical information contained in the second part of the extract is 
unproblematically accepted by Millis, who concentrates on a different issue: to show 
experimentally how readers update perspective in a rigid internal/external binary, i.e., how 
they perceive shifts in deictic center, and not to explore the formal means that convey 
those changes, ñor the exact significance of shifts in the structure of the narrative story 
used in the experiment. To sum up, psychological paraphernalia are not used to describe 
the psychological processes represented in narrative, and their likely symptomatic.11 
Similar methodological problems can be observed when we consider the application 
of stylistic research to the ideological facet of point of view, reflected in the notion of 
mind-style: borders between the ideological and the psychological are far from distinct, 
because both facets fall within the same general notion of "attitude," and the individual's 
mind is the locus of worldview. The ideological facet is defined in a stylistic context as 
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"any distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self' (Fowler Linguistics 
and the Novel 103): "consistent structural options, agreeing in cutting the presented world 
to one pattern or another, give rise to an impression of a world-view, what I shall cali a 
'mind-style'. In the novel, there may be a network of voices at different levéis, each 
presenting a distinct mode of consciousness" (Fowler Linguistics and the Novel 76). The 
strong psychological flavour is confirmed by Fowler's references to M.A.K. Halliday's 
analysis of William Golding's The Inheritors, where an internal method of point of view 
is used to represent the cognitive limitations of Lok, the Neanderthal hero: this illustrates 
the idea that "a writer may créate a narrator, or a character, whose language expresses a 
characteristic or idiosyncratic point of view" (Linguistic Criticism 133). Despite the 
mental-psychological connotation, it is clear for Fowler that mind-style's genuine 
theoretical ground is the ideological: "[mind-style is] the world-view of an author, or a 
narrator, or a character, constituted by the ideational structure of the text. From now on I 
shall prefer this term to the cumbersome 'point of view on the ideological plañe' which 
I borrowed from Uspensky ... the notions are equivalent" (Linguistic Criticism 150). If 
Fowler's previous statement does not suffice, any psychological quality in the traditional 
narratological fashion dissolves when we consider the stylistic emphasis: the ideological 
facet explores the relationship between an individual and his environment as reflected in 
linguistic choices at different levéis. In this sense mind-style can be relevant for the 
analysis of narrative method, since language is a useful symptom for the identification of 
the mind (i.e. world-view) from which the story is told. 
In this section I have tried to show some ingredients of the implementation of new 
perspectives on focalization —the identification of three facets and the vindication of a 
more conceptual notion of focalization— but I have concentrated on how the múltiple 
descriptive uses of the spatiotemporal, psychological and ideological have been 
problematically forced into (or annexed to) the syntactic goals of narratological study, 
resisting the radical selection of the original choice of focalization. Some problems remain 
unsolved, as, for instance, the elucidation of the figure of the focalizer in relation with 
those of the implied author and the narrator. This is specially clear in the handling of 
subjectivity, and particularly in the special resonance of the narrator's subjectivity in 
narratives using an internal focalization technique. In the following section I will show a 
parallel situation, revealed by the incorporation of a modal perspective to typologies of 
focalization. 
2. Modality in Point of View: the Necessity of Modal Worlds. 
Modality has been applied in the frame of point of view on the psychological plañe 
(Fowler Linguistics and the Novel, Linguistic Criticism. Simpson) to develop a broader 
(more complete, less dependent on visual aspects), deeper (more relevant to psychological 
aspects such as the feelings and thoughts experienced by focalizers) view of focalization. 
The declared theoretical source of this modal expansión is systemic-functional linguistics 
and stylistics. In narratological terms it joins Bal's levéis of story and text, as the classical 
internal/external opposition in focalization is complemented with an analysis of the 
narrator's style to convey it, which generates a superimposed internal/external (or 
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narrator's intermedíate absence/presence). The formal tool selected is modality: "the 
grammar of explicit comment, the means by which people express their degree of 
commitment to the truth of the propositions they utter, and their views on the desirability 
or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to" (Fowler Linguistic Criticism 131. Simpson 
39). 
Roger Fowler {Linguistic Criticism 134) supplements the classic distinction between 
an internal and an external position with respect to action or characters with two other 
possibilities, which derive from the presence or absence of marks of modality: modality 
is foregrounded with the presence of "verba sentiendi" —"words denoting thoughts, 
feelings and perceptions" (Simpson 39). Their effect is to convey the impression of a 
definite, subjective, personality expressing itself in relation to the narrated substance, 
provoking "strangement,"12 while the absence of these verba suppresses the impression of 
a sepárate consciousness mediating between events and the reader, i.e., blurs the textual 
trace of an external subjective focalization. The practical outcome of Fowler's double 
choice is a catalogue of four possibilities: 
TYPE 
A 
B 
C 
D 
PERSPECTIVE 
internal 
internal 
external 
external 
MODALITY 
foregrounded 
absent 
absent 
foregrounded 
DESCRIPTION 
fírst person 
omniscient authorial 
impersonal neutral 
external speculative 
Paul Simpson's more recent proposal of a "modal grammar" opens with a positive 
revisión of Fowler's model, specially the necessity of the concept of modality, but he holds 
that "a stylístician working with this model might find some problems" (51-2). Simpson's 
reworking consists of three main operations: A) Four modal systems are identified, which 
represent non-linguistic concepts: the deontic expresses duty, obligation and commitment; 
the boulomaic reflects desire; the epistemic expresses knowledge, belief and cognition; 
and, finally. the perception system. B) The traditional internal-external distinction is 
replaced by two asymmetrical distinctions, yielding three possibilities: category A 
narratives are homodiegetic; category B are heterodiegetíc. The latter are then divided into 
Narratorial mode ("from a 'floating' viewing position." Simpson 55), and Reflector mode 
(when the telling voice moves "into the active mind of a particular character." Simpson 
55). C) Each of the three previous possibilities is subdivided on the pattern of three broad 
patterns of modality, rather arbitrarily called "positive," "négative," and "neutral." The 
logic underlying these distinctions and labels is simple: the presence of linguistic formulae 
expressing deontic and boulamic systems are "positive," and reflect the narrator's 
subjective evaluation and involvement. Conversely, the presence of markers of epistemic 
and perception systems are "négative," and their effect is alienating. It is assumed that the 
presence of markers of the positive type (deontic, boulomaic) precludes the appearance of 
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markers of the other type, and viceversa. In "neutral" varieties categorical assertions take 
precedence over modalized expressions. The chart is a summary of Simpson's (75): 
Category A homodiegetic 
Category B 
heterodiegetic 
Narratorial mode 
Reflector mode 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
"co-operative" 
distancing effect 
"fíat", unreflective 
opinions and judgement 
narrator tries to make sense of story 
narrator refuses privileged access 
character's position. Opinions. 
strangement in the mind of character. 
Double focalization 
viewing position of passive character 
Our previous discussion of narratology's selective psychology is relevant again: 
Fowler's and Simpson's typologies incorpórate modality as another means of further 
discriminating between different degrees of focalization, by measuring the narrator's 
mental (cognitive or emotive) position in relation to action. Introducing deontic, boulomaic 
modality, etc. explains the problem of the focalizer's involvement or knowledge of the 
story in a more sophisticated, but similar, vein than in narratology. These proposals could 
be negatively assessed because of the excessive formalism of the search of formal marks 
of modality or because of the lack of harmony between the wholehearted reliance on an 
exclusive internal/external (or narratorial/reflector) opposition, and the relatively 
impressionistic determination of modality. However, I will comment on the problem this 
model shares with those described in the previous section: there I showed that the 
expansión of narrative point of view into psychology/ideology has made the adjustment 
of findings more clearly strained and reductive, because narration always contains or 
betrays another superimposed subjectivity, another point of view. My proposal in this 
section is that it is very difficult to assume that the implementation of a modal perspective 
can be satisfactorily carried out if the exclusivity of the grammatical approach to 
focalization is preserved, because dealing with indications of desire, duty, etc, as mere 
marks of epistemic "strangement" or emotional "involvement" in the área of focalization 
is equally restrictive. Once these factors are introduced in the analysis it is difficult not to 
see that the modal significance of narrative action itself, of the "narrated" interferes in the 
analysis of the modality of the "narrating." 
What is needed, perhaps, is to complement and articúlate models of modality with 
another modal system that explains how stories are built (and analysed) on these 
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parameters. Such an important incorporation of modality is present in DolezeFs proposal 
of narrative modalities, "global (macrostructural) semantic constraints... global restrictions 
imposed on the possible courses of narrated actions" (Narrative Worlds 543). In order to 
characterize narrative coherence Dolezel selected a set of modal narrative worlds, 
characteristically ruled by principies that organize fictional action, or make it follow 
certain courses or foreground specific conflicts or contrasts: 
a. In alethic worlds actions are organized according to the modalities of possibility, 
impossibility, and necessity. This modality allows for a rigorous analysis of devices of 
construction and authentication of fictional worlds, and for distinctions between natural, 
supernatural, and intermedíate (i.e., mythological, fantastic, ambiguous) worlds (548-551). 
b. In deontic worlds the significance of actions derives from the modalities of 
permission, prohibition, and obligation; actions are classified as prohibited/permitted 
(failure to perform an action imposed as obligation is obviously equivalent to prohibited 
action), and logically lead to strings as violation-punishment or fulfillment-reward (544). 
c. In axiological worlds the modalities of goodness, badness, and indifference, actions 
are prompted by valúes (desires) and dysvalues (repulsions); two realms can genérate these 
assignments of valué: a supraindividual codex (codexal) or an individual (relativized): 
"The existence of relativized modalities brings narrative agents into mutual modal 
relationships. If their relativized modalities are identical we will say that the agents are in 
the state of modal concord. If their relativized modalities are contrary (or, at least, 
different), we will speak about modaldiscordbetween narrative agents. It can be assumed 
that modal concord will lead to stories of alliance (cooperation), whereas modal discord 
to stories of conflict" (545). 
d. Knowledge, ignorance and belief are the modalities of epistemic worlds, so typical 
of mystery stories, whose modal base is "the transformation of ignorance (or false belief) 
into knowledge" (545). 
DolezeFs modality, proposed in an "extensional" frame, is expected to supplement the 
grammar of narrative action with a systematization of the possible contents prevailing in 
fictional worlds, but we could also consider its relevance to complement focalization, to 
help it make more sense. However, it would be also helped itself, it would make more 
sense, because it would correct a "weakness" of DolezeFs model: the lack of concern with 
the transforming or conditioning power of modalized discourse over modal substance. 
How is the modal type of a narrative determined? The answer from extensional semantics 
is that the substance of the story makes it a natural decisión: "modal constraints [are] 
imposed in the particular worlds" (Dolezel Narrative Worlds 544. My italics). This 
statement relies on a classic conception of narrative technique, because it accepts an 
unquestioned, reliable, neutral and omniscient narrator who does not influence, who does 
not modalize the story and of the world, the kind of external narrator the effects of whose 
focalization, understood as "restriction," is quite negligible. The modal nature of a 
narrative text is the (implied) author's responsibility only in the sense that this external 
agent modalizes the story by selecting events with a particular modal nature. DolezeFs 
model could then be said to be insufficient, but also necessary, to understand point of view 
on the psychological plañe. The marks of modality "contained" in fictional worlds or 
stories are also information to be included in any model designed to describe modality in 
Blurring Focalization: Psychological Expansions of Point of View and Modality 75 
psychological point of view. Of course a similar claim could be made to justify any 
author's selection of a particular focalization device on the spatiotemporal plañe: for 
instance, in"whodunit" stories the range of possibilities of focalization "activated" (all the 
agents who have "seen" anything) are organized in such a way that suspense is created and 
the identification of the murderer-criminal is delayed (see Bal 114-5); it is undeniable that 
there is always interaction between the quality of the story and the type of focalization 
used in the story, and effects are achieved because the grammar of point of view has been 
coordinated with "the quality of the story." However, it seems to me that the necessity of 
interaction in the case of modality and the psychological facet is still more manifest, 
because it is more difficult to isolate the orientation (significance) of the story —the modal 
interpretation normally attributed by readers to actions— from the orientations possibly 
privileged by the focalizer, the narrator, or the implied author, especially since the 
identities of these figures cannot be easily disentangled. 
The strength of the theoretical necessity of an articulation of intensional and 
extensional models will occupy me in the next section, but I will not predict any combined 
theoretical model. Instead, I will represent the issue as an analytical problem and as a 
property of texts with an interesting aesthetic potential. I have summarized it with the 
question "who modalizes?," and it is well illustrated by the ambiguities of Greene's story; 
my analysis will show: 1) that serious descriptive problems arise when modal theories of 
point of view are not complemented with the kind of extensional semantic perspective 
offered by Dolezel, that the application of modality in narrative theories of focalization 
should be appended (articulated) with a semantic perspective using the modal approach; 
2) that the theory of modality and point of view reflected in Greene's story (see note 2 
above) demands the combination of information about the modal qualities of the narrated 
story and the modality of the narrative method. The aesthetic principie favoured by the 
text's theory foregrounds and malees highly functional the combination of these two 
sources. 
3. Who/What focalizes/modalizes in Greene's "I Spy"? Story Structure and Focalization. 
3.0 "I Spy." The text. 
Charlie Stowe waited until he heard his mother snore before he got out of bed. Even then 
he moved with caution and tiptoed to the window. The front of the house was irregular, 
so that it was possible to see a light burning in his mother's room. But now all the 
windows were dark. A searchlight passed across the sky, lighting the banks of cloud and 
probing the dark spaces between, seeking enemy airships. The wind flew from the sea, 
and Charlie Stowe could hear behind his mother's snores the beating of the waves. A 
draught through the cracks in the window-frame stirred his night-shirt. Charlie Stowe was 
frightened. 
But the thought of the tobacconist's shop which his father kept down a dozen 
wooden stairs drew him on. He was twelve years oíd, and already boys at the County 
School mocked him because he had never smoked a cigarette. The packets were piled 
twelve deep below, Gold Flake and Player's, De Reszke, Abdulla, Woodbines, and the 
little shop lay under a thin haze of stale smoke which would completely disguise his 
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crime. That it was a crime to steal some of his father's stock Charlie Stowe had no doubt, 
but he did not love his father; his father was unreal to him, a wraith, palé, thin, indefinite, 
who noticed him only spasmodically and left even punishment to his mother. For his 
mother he felt a passionate demonstrative love; her large boisterous presence and her 
noisy charity fílled the world for him; from her speech he judged her the friend of 
everyone, from the rector's wife to the "dear Queen", except the "Huns", the monsters 
who lurked in Zeppelins in the clouds. But his father's affection and dislike were as 
indefinite as his movements. Tonight he had said he would be in Norwich, and yet you 
never knew. Charlie Stowe had no sense of safety as he crept down the wooden stairs. 
When they creaked he clenched his fingere on the collar of his night-shirt. 
At the bottom of the stairs he carne out quite suddenly into the little shop. It was too 
dark to see his way, and he did not daré touch the switch. For half a minute he sat in 
despair on the bottom step with his chin cupped in his hand. Then the regular movement 
of the searchlight was reflected through an upper window and the boy had time to fix in 
memory the pile of cigarettes, the counter and the small hole under it. The footsteps of a 
policeman on the pavement made him grab the first packet to his hand and dive for the 
hole. A light shone along the floor and a hand tried the door, then the footsteps passed on, 
and Charlie cowered in the darkness. 
At last he got his courage back by telling himself in his curiously adult way that if 
he were caught now there was nothing to be done about it, and he might as well have his 
smoke. He put a cigarette in his mouth and then remembered that he had no matches. For 
a while he dared not move. Three times the searchlight lit the shop, as he muttered taunts 
and encouragements. "May as well be hung for a sheep", "Cowardy, cowardy custard," 
grown-up and childish exhortations oddly mixed. 
But as he moved he heard footfalls in the street, the sound of several men walking 
rapidly. Charlie Stowe was oíd enough to feel surprise that anybody was about. The 
footsteps carne nearer, stopped; a key was turned in the shop door, a voice said: "Let him 
in," and then he heard his father, "If you wouldn't mind being quiet, gentlemen. I don't 
want to wake up the family." There was a note unfamiliar to Charlie in the undecided 
voice. A torch flashed and the electric globe burst into blue light. The boy held his breath; 
he wondered whether his father would hear his heart beating, and he clutched his night-
shirt tightly and prayed, "O God, don't let me be caught." Through a crack in the counter 
he could see his father where he stood, one hand held to his high stiff collar, between two 
men in bowler hats and belted mackintoshes. They were strangers. 
"Have a cigarette," his father said in a voice dry as a biscuit. One of the men shook 
his head. "It wouldn't do, not when we are on duty. Thank you all the same." He spoke 
gently, but without kindness: Charlie Stowe thought his father must be ill. 
"Mind if I put a few in my pocket?" Mr Stowe asked, and when the man nodded he 
lifted a pile of Gold Flake and Players from a shelf and caressed the packets with the tips 
of his fingere. 
"Well," he said, "there's nothing to be done about it, and I may as well have my 
smokes." For a moment Charlie feared discovery, his father stared the shop so thoroughly; 
he might have been seeing it for the first time. "It's a good little business," he said, "for 
those that like it. The wife will sell out, I suppose. Else the neighbours'U be wrecking it. 
Well, you want to be off. A stitch in time. 1*11 get my coat." 
"One of us'll come with you, if you don't mind," said the stranger gently. 
"You needn't trouble. It's on the peg here. There, I'm all ready." 
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The other man said in an embarrassed way, "Don't you want to speak to your wife?" 
The thin voice was decided, "Not me. Never do today what you can put off till tomorrow. 
She'll have her chance later, won't she?" 
"Yes, yes," one of the strangers said and he became very cheerful and encouraging. 
"Don't you worry too much. While there is life ..." and suddenly his father tried to laugh. 
When the door had closed Charlie Stowe tiptoed upstairs and got into bed. He 
wondered why his father had left the house again so late at night and who the strangers 
were. Surprise and awe kept him for a little while awake. It was as if a familiar 
photograph had stepped from the frame to reproach him with neglect. He remembered 
how his father had held tight to his collar and fortified himself with proverbs, and he 
thought for the first time that, while his mother was boisterous and kindly, his father was 
very much like himself, doing things in the dark which frightened him. It would have 
pleased him to go down to his father and tell him that he loved him, but he could hear 
through the window the quick steps going away. He was alone in the house with his 
mother, and he fell asleep. 
3.1. The deictic dimensión: spatiotemporal focalization and perception. 
This third-person narration is clearly built on the choice of Charlie Stowe's physical 
perspective; the structure of the story is made to coincide with his experience. Concerning 
the spatiotemporal facet, the story opens with the boy in bed and ends in the same place, 
when the boy falls asleep. We could say that there is a story because the boy decides to 
make this nightly expedition, or, more precisely, because he is "there" awake and 
downstairs when his father comes in with the strangers; in other words, because he is there 
to focalize. Of course the fact that the narration is in third person does not change 
anything; anyway, we could say that, strictly speaking, the narrating voice physically 
focalizes the boy, who in turn focalizes all the other objects and events, but at the 
theoretical level of the story this narrating voice is irrelevant. This personal perspective, 
this "deictic center" is consistently kept when references to events outside the strict 
temporal frame of the story are made: 1) The boy's motivation for tonight's conduct is 
having being mocked at school. Boys have mocked at him and we have to suppose that he 
has heard them. 2) His parents and their behaviour appear in the story as images perceived 
by Charlie and experienced by him in this moment. There is nothing about them that has 
not been seen by him. This dimensión has consequences in Charlie's disaffections (he "left 
even punishment to his mother") and explain (or modulate) the boy's attitude to his 
"crime." 3) His father announcement about going to Norwich that night is part of the boy's 
experience, fears and surprise. In other words, all information external to the 
spatiotemporal frame of the story is "here" because it has been spatiotemporally perceived 
by the boy. This principie is followed even when we consider the specifics of the spatial 
dimensión, the amount of information that can be visually obtained by the boy is 
considered, and carefully complements the information he can hear: he learns the position 
of cigarettes (and we see them) thanks to the "searchlight"; when the boy is hidden in the 
shop, he has a look (and we too) at the adults' movements and gestures "through a creak 
in the counter." 
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3.2 The psychological dimensión (1): narration and the emergence of another subjectivity. 
Greene's story coincides with Charlie's experience also in a psychological sense. Taking 
focalization in the original, objective Genettian sense of "restrictíon of field" {Figuras III 
245), the narrator has limited what can be told in the área of cognition and emotions, in 
the área of inner life, to only one of the many agents of the story; it is fixed internal 
focalization {Figuras III245) or type B (heterodiegetic) technique in the Reflector mode 
(Simpson 55) because it is character-bound, and bound exclusively to this character, not 
to any other. Besides, we have numerous indications of the boy's cognitive limitations (the 
war context is not linked by him to his personal world, and specially to his father's) and 
of his mental processing of his experiences: "waited until he heard," "was frightened", 
"the thought ... drew him on", etc. Although in third person, it is easy to imagine these 
commentaries as formulated (i.e. perceived) by the character, and they pass the test 
suggested by Barthes for the personal mode —"rewriting" them in first person does not 
alter our perception of the source of commentaries or experiences (Genette Figuras III 
247-8). 
However, the way of looking at the psychological facet of point of view these 
classifications reveal —the narrator tells/knows what Charlie thinks and not what other 
agents think— although objective and unproblematic, is superficial and inadequately 
"quantitative." Besides, it is restrictive and very artificial, because some problems 
frequently overlooked when dealing with spatiotemporal focalization become more 
prominent when applied to the psychological, intellectual or cognitive realm. For instance, 
how the focalizer is also focalized and how mental perspectives and operations are always 
contaminated. Small details in Greene's story like the "creak in the counter" invite us to 
think of focalization in a literal sense, with Charlie's eyes as a camera recording what can 
be told, and this image supports the impression that Charlie is a "puré" and exclusive 
focalizer. However, if we remember Genette's commentaries on the practical improbability 
of internal focalization (see end of section 1.2.1 above), the very beginning of Greene's 
story "Charlie Stowe ..." confirms the impression that even at a physical level Charlie is 
simultaneously focalized and focalizer: he is described and designated. Only because there 
is not contradiction or contrast between what the "eyes" of the external focalizer (who 
follows Charlie) and Charlie's eyes we tend to simplify the analysis by omitting the 
external focalizer and Charlie's being a focalized. 
But how does this logic fare in the área of Charlie's inner life? Theoretically speaking 
internal focalization exeludes mediation in our access to the focalizer's inner life or mental 
activity; it implies that we can isolate the focalizer's subjectivity and his/her grasping of 
the reality surrounding him/her. As we will see in these pages, this is not the case in 
Greene's story, because Charlie is a psychological focalizer of his reality, but he is 
simultaneously a psychologically focalized in various ways, and in the text we read an 
amalgam of two subjectivities: Charlie's psychological life has been interpreted by another 
subjectivity, one that has summarised, organized and evaluated Charlie's "motivation," 
"affection," "attitude to his crime," "fear and surprise," although merely by "wording" 
them. Genette also speaks of objective analysis ("analice objetivamente"). However the 
ideas of objectivity and analysis are extremely difficult to determine in this context, 
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because we cannot always decide to what extent internal focalization (Charlie's thoughts) 
includes unacknowledged analysis "embedded" in narrative discourse).13 For instance we 
can consider the statement "Surprise and awe kept him for a little while awake.... He 
remembered how his father had ... fortified himself with proverbs". Can we assume that 
this is a direct "transcript" of Charlie's consciousness? To what extent has he 
conceptualized his surprise and awe? To what extent is he aware that his father's purpose 
is to dispel fear? Despite the possible irrelevance of this information, these sentences 
reveal that some external focalizer is incorporating his own valúes and interests, 
subjectivity in ambiguous, undecidable ways. 
This dimensión, which has been only occasionally alluded to by critics, cannot be 
easily interpreted by following the traditional typological efforts:14 it rather reveáis the 
existence of a scale of possibilities in the description of psychological observations that 
is not clearly resolved in the "knowledge'Vabsence of knowledge" binary of narratological 
theory, because not all commentaries require the same amount of interpretation or 
introspective power on the part of the narrator, and also because the boy's mental 
processes and producís exhibit several degrees of development, reflexivity, intentionality, 
and sophistication, ranging from "elaborated" analytical deliberation to spontaneous 
instinctive impression. The focalizer's mental processes are not clearly organized in an 
internal/external, reflector/narratorial binary, but arranged in an extremely complex scale 
of intermedíate possibilities. These internal possibilities range from almost "factual" 
statements that "conceal" the figure of the narrator and reduce him to a linguistic position 
("waited until he heard," "Charlie was frightened") to statements of uncertain authorship, 
in which we can detect the presence of "autonomous" interpretative operations, the 
presence of particular interests that cannot be always automatically attributed to the 
focalizer. This last possibility is suggested by commentaries like: 
the thought of the tobacconist's shop which his father kept down a dozen wooden stairs 
drew him on. He was twelve years oíd, and already boys at the County School mocked 
him because he had never smoked a cigarette. 
It is not at all clear to what extent the forcé to go downstairs is perceived by the boy 
as an impulse or as a delibérate meditation, but a more important problem is that of 
deciding if the boy's having been mocked is part of his thoughts at the moment. We could 
think that the boy remembers his schoolmates's laughing at him to encourage himself; 
however, the commentary sounds like an adult, objective summary of the event, a 
justification of his behaviour. We could think of a mere interpretative act connecting the 
two sentences (then still part of internal focalization), but also consider it a narratorial (or 
authorial) decisión to introduce the theme of manhood. To attribute this commentary to 
one or another source is important to decide whether we are dealing with focalization, if 
we accept Edmiston's commentary: "A distinction must be made between what the 
narrator can perceive and what he chooses to reveal, and the latter does not concern 
focalization" (731). Comparable observations can be made if we consider the following 
statement: 
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a thin haze of stale smoke which would completely disguise his crime. That it was a 
crime to steal some of his father's stock Charlie Stowe had no doubt, but he did not love 
his father; his father was unreal to him. 
The concept of crime is described as an evaluation of the incident, and Charlie could 
share it, but this impression is not favoured by the style of narration. A similar shade of 
uncertainty is present in the justification ("but he did not love his father"), because to 
simply attribute this reflection to the boy (and exelude any element of mediation by the 
narrator) is not convincing (it could be a simple device to give the reader a piece of 
information the reader will need later on). These instances of ambiguity should suffice to 
propose that an heterodiegetic internal point of view, a reflector mode, never completely 
conceals or precludes the appearance of a sepárate consciousness organizing and orienting 
commentaries. In Greene's story we have such a figure of an independent and active 
"focalizing mind" coexisting with the focalizer Charlie, and makes his mind, 
simultaneously rather than alternatively, a focalized and a focalizer. These uncertain 
statements concerning the "source" of reflections and connections coexist in the other end 
of the scale with other instances in which the narratorial stance is more decisively 
expressed and assumed, i.e. while Charlie's mind is responsible for his affections and 
fears, some commentaries on Charlie's age and intellectual development are the narrator's 
responsibility: "in his curiously adult way", "grown-up and childish exhortations oddly 
mixed", "Charlie was oíd enough to feel surprise." These statements undeniably belong 
to the narratorial mode because they cannot possibly derive from Charlie's thoughts. 
Besides, it is a curious blend of the narratorial and the internal, because these 
commentaries are scarce and scrupulously restricted to Charlie's psychological dimensión, 
and quite objective. In fact, the notion of restriction is important to explain one important 
structural principie of Graham Greene's story. The issue dealt with by the narrator's 
commentaries, the problem thematized by the narrator—Charlie's "restricted" age— is also 
revealed through a technique that foregrounds the problem of Charlie's knowledge, the 
nature of his affections and their evolution as caused by his age and its limitations. The 
problem, to discuss in the following section, is whether this technique belongs to what 
critics cali focalization and modalization, or what notion of focalization we need to cover 
Greene's technique. 
I have emphasised some "impurities" of Greene's technique to show how his impure 
internal technique refleets the theoretical problems of typologies of focalization. As far as 
the intrinsic poetics of focalization of Greene's story is concerned, we have seen that 
different degrees of narratorial "psychological" or intellectual involvement or activity (not 
simply perceptual access!) in the rendering of Charlie's inner life are combined with others 
in which the narratorial responsibility is more formally, but still to some extent 
uncertainly, acknowledged. In other words, the neatness of the theoretical distinction 
between narratorial and reflector modes very easily collapses in practice, because 
(taxonomically) undesirable phenomena as double focalization and ambiguous focalization 
are not at all marginal exceptions but the inescapable norm, and elucidation is broadly 
impressionistic. This is specially clear in this psychological dimensión, when we consider 
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the many traces (and degrees) of the narrator's psychological intervention, i.e. the 
uncertain superposition of the narrator's and the focalizer's mindscapes.15 
3.3 The Psychological Dimensión (2): Childhood, Strange Conversations and Modality. 
In the previous section we have assumed an inevitable "other" focalizer that brings tensión 
to the analytical simplifications of structuralist-oriented narratologists. At least to explain 
Greene's practice the traditional selective omniscience technique (Friedman) could be 
perhaps a more intelligent and competent category, precisely because of its heterogeneity: 
we institute a narrator who more or less faithfully represents Charlie's consciousness, but 
does not make himself prominent as narrator (or as author). The difficulties of focalization 
are important if we consider another fact about Greene's story: there is a moment in the 
narrative in which the reader feels s/he has to genérate an "autonomous" interpretation, and 
it is also felt that something about the adult world is not understood by the hidden witness 
Charlie. The necessity of generating this autonomous interpretation is due to a restriction 
in the text, one that is not so dramatically perceived in the first part of the story. If we 
remember Edmiston's previous commentary, we have to decide whether this is a problem 
of focalization —restriction of field— or simply a narratorial omission of information. 
Should we first determine whose responsibility is the missing information—the focalizer's 
because beyond his scope or the narrator's because he prefers not to tell it— in order to 
declare whether focalization is or is not involved here? Apparently the answer is not 
difficult if we remember that the narrator's commentaries on Charlie's age focus on an 
aspect considered paradigmatic in classic studies on point of view (Booth Rhetoric of 
Fiction 47-9) and focalization: fixed internal focalization is illustrated by Genette with 
Henry James' What Maisie Knew. In James' story we are told of events of an adult story 
through the experience and perception of a girl who cannot understand what is happening. 
The paradigmatic quality of childhood to explain psychological focalization has been 
already shown in this study with Bal's choice of children to explain the psychological 
dimensión of perception, and it is not a coincidence that Bal also selects Maisie to 
introduce internal focalization, or character-bound focalization: 
... a character-bound focalizor... brings about bias and limitation. In Henry James' What 
Maisie Knew the focalization lies almost entirely with Maisie, a little girl who does not 
understand much about the problematic relations going on around her. Consequently, the 
reader is shown the events through the limited visión of the girl, and only gradually 
realizes what is actually going on. But the reader is not a little girl. S/he does more with 
the information s/he receives than Maisie does, s/he interprets it differently. Where 
Maisie sees only a strange gesture, the reader knows that s/he is dealing with an erotic 
one. (104-5) 
The reference to a limited visión and the reader gradually realizing what is actually 
going on seems to make application inevitable, but we have the narrator's commentaries 
on Charlie's mental development, in which by calling the reader's attention to Charlie's 
interpretative weaknesses, the narrator "announces" the section of the story in which 
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Charlie's cognitive limitations are more evident; i.e., an external focalizer explicitly warns 
about a future transition into an internal focalizer, and Charlie becomes a focalizer 
(witness) after having been simultaneously focalizer and focalized. The mechanism is 
extremely interesting because until then readers, "satisfied" with the information they have 
been given about Charlie did not notice this double role: readers perceived the world in 
terms of Charlie's inner life and the narrator's interventions were easily assimilated as 
springing from him. And still another interesting explanation using descriptive tools 
related to focalization is that when Charlie witnesses —perceives— the adult conversation 
readers are forced to start processing —conceptualizing— it independently. 
An important test to confirm the pertinence of the internal focalization category could 
be provided by the analysis of the modal markers. Assuming that the heterodiegetic 
reflector mode is the dominant technique, Charlie's interpretative problems should be well 
represented by the presence of modal markers of the epistemic system, those classified by 
Simpson as making the negative type. It is undeniable that a note of epistemic strangement 
is communicated in this section of the story, but we have to decide whether: a) they are 
genuinely attributable to Charlie's defective perception of events (or more precisely 
defective or absent conceptualization), b) they depend on the narrator's (deficient or 
absent) perception of Charlie's mind, c) both focalizers are epistemically stranged, that is, 
with epistemic strangement imposed on double focalization, or, d) none of them is modally 
marked, strangement is due to a mere absence of narratorial explanation about the event. 
While the boy's apistemic strangement clearly smooths the enormous emotional intensity 
of the situation of the adults and transforms the conversation into a riddle, it is more 
difficult to decide the focal source of the commentaries annexed to direct speech: Charlie's 
father is constantly characterised through references to the tone of his voice —"a tone 
unfamiliar," "undecided voice," "voice dry as a biscuit," "spoke gently but without 
kindness"— and the same applies to the strangers —"gently," "embarrassed," "decided," 
"cheerful," "encouraging." These commentaries are ambiguous concerning their source, 
as can be observed by comparing them with a more explicit remark as "Charlie Stowe 
thought his father must be ill". This last sentence obviously comments on Charlie's poor 
interpretative faculties, but we cannot say that in the previous instances there is 
focalization in the sense of alteration or deformation of information because of lack of 
intellectual competence, in Maisie's way (as commented by Bal about erotic movements 
not identified by the girl). Commentaries on the tones and moods of the voices are those 
we expect in a person who is alien to the background of the conversation, but they are 
quite precise and they require a certain degree of adult interpretation. In short, the 
uncertain identity of the focalizing source makes the type of modality and the relevance 
of focalization also uncertain: 
1. If the boy is the one processing the emotions associated to the voices the passage 
from perception into conception is initiated, or perhaps completed, but not to the point of 
allowing the boy to put all the pieces together, to interpret them —to identify and 
understand his father's problem. However, this very last stage of the intellectual processing 
of the situation cannot be said to be, strictly speaking, a problem of focalization. 
2. If the narrator is the source of commentaries on moods betrayed by words, we 
cannot speak of epistemic strangement, at least if we use Simpson's description, which 
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concentrates on "double focalization" in a reductive fashion. Simpson's emphasis and 
examples (Kafka's The Trial) are unfair in Greene's text, because a basic distinction has 
to be established between the narrator's unlimited knowledge of Charlie's mind and 
Charlie's extremely limited knowledge of his father's inner life. There is no negative 
modality concerning the narrator's power, and his/her refusal to explain what has escaped 
Charlie's attention "does not concern focalization." 
The presence and possible application of these signs of strangement yields important 
information about the text. In this respect modality can be useful to describe focalization, 
but not following Simpson's sequential and taxonomic logic, where a more or less 
impressionistic distinction is added to a previous apparently "neat" distinction between 
reflector and narratorial modes. Modality is simply another category that can practically 
perform functions equivalent to those of modes of narration, and not so clearly a 
supplementary distinction realized on top of an "unproblematic" reflector/narratorial 
binary. 
Modality has an important role to play in focalization, but as one in a range of 
equivalent possibilities of communicating effects derived from restrictions of knowledge, 
different motivations, etc., and one, again, not restricted to Simpson's or Fowler's 
grammatical approaches: the introduction of the modal perspective has to be coordinated 
with (because it is significant in the context of) the intrinsic modal quality of the story, 
following Dolezel's typology. In this respect, an extensional approach to modal systems 
has much to say about Greene's story, because elements of the deontic, axiological and 
epistemic systems are present in the "substance" of the story: 
a) DEONTIC: A forbidden action, performed by the boy, is not detected, while the 
father's forbidden actions have been detected by the strangers. There is an important 
emotional orientation in the narration of this modality, because the boy's fears and anxiety 
are systematically emphasised. 
b) AXIOLOGICAL: The prohibition is based on the goodness/badness of actions, but 
also on the boy's affective dimensión, his shifting alliances with his parents: these change 
from the mother to the father, but also from a supraindividual codex (the official patriotic 
language of his mother), to a relativized, prívate and secret one, from discord to concord 
in relation with his father, "doing things in the dark which frightened him." 
c) The EPISTEMIC is also problematic and significant, one connected with the issue 
of psychological growth: there is a movement in Charlie's consciousness from complete 
ignorance into incomplete knowledge about his father, and also towards superior 
knowledge about himself. This last movement is paradoxical, because Charlie's increased 
sense of identity is motivated by external pressure (act of maturity induced by others) and 
leads to identification with his father. 
Many effects (or ironies) of the story can be explained with these ingredients: Charlie's 
movement into spiritual concord with his father is articulated with his lack of 
understanding of the events perceived. Another aspect is added to this, since the boy 
moves from spiritual loneliness (with his mother) into spiritual company with his father, 
but this is ruined by the physical loneliness (with his mother) announced at the end of the 
story. 
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4. Conclusión. 
No level of refinement is likely to help us adapt the model for a thoroughly rigorous 
analysis or classification of entire narratives. (Nelles 371) 
It is the fate of most neat distinctions in literary theory to be refuted at least by some 
literary texts. (Stanzel Teller-Characters 12) 
The history of focalization has been one of continuous reworking and improvement, 
although hardly accumulative from Consolidated analytical possibilities, because in the 
movement from the perceptual (visual) to the conceptual the continuity of methods has 
been particularly difficult. Nelles' and Stanzel's commentaries opening this section seem 
to focus on the apparent insufficiency of original models when faced with creative practice 
(especially for the elucidation of internal focalization in heterodiegetic narration); 
however, a new insufficiency should also be considered —the loss of neatness of models 
when some improvements (eg. modality) have been uncertainly appended to the original 
dichotomies. My goal has been to show not only some of the difficulties of the evolution 
of focalization (the practical marginalization of mind-styles, mindscapes, etc.), but the 
analytical consequences of the introduction of modality. It has been revealed that the 
grammatical tendency of original distinctions cannot be easily imitated in the frame of 
these expansions: modality, for instance, cannot be easily adapted to the role an internal 
subcategory of the ambiguous, heterogeneous amalgam of technical possibilities 
focalization has become in its complex history of expansions and contractions. This 
portrait of the tensions and problems of the models as they develop does not preclude an 
invitation to apply as many analytical possibilities as can be found useful (for instance 
modality from the standpoint of extensional narrative semantics), but to correct some 
restrictive tendencies of narratological theories of point of view. 
Notes 
1. My title plays with Nelles' formula "getting focalization into focus". It also recalls Jackson 
Barry's "expansión of narrative theory" (295) but my interests are opposite to his: Barry complains 
about "appropriations" of narrative by psychologists, while I am concerned with the application 
of psychological inquiry in narrative studies. The expansión can be described as a movement from 
a perceptual perspective to a conceptual one, or, in another context, as the attempts to incorpórate 
extensional semantic distinctions into the syntactically organized frame of narratology, i.e., to 
grammaticize them. 
2. Two notes: a) the first correction ("illustrated" instead of "assessed") implies that a radical, 
naive instrumentalist option is rejected; b) "use" of point of view is understood as "implicit 
theory": every text generates (or possesses) its own relevant set of point of view distinctions. In 
consequence, available typologies of point of view are constantly challenged by the typologies 
"built" in texts. 
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3. The geographical reference to an Anglo-American domain appears in Rimmon-Kenan (71), 
not in Genette's description: his choice of "focalization" is inspired by "focus of narration" 
(Brooks-Warren). Among those who use "point of view" as a global concept Genette mentions 
Lubbock, E.M. Forster and Booth (Rhetoric ofFictiorí), but also Stanzel (Narrative Situations). 
In recent contributions to Poetics waáPoetics Today focalization is more usual and more debated. 
Thus, we could think of an alternative chronological, not geographic, contrast (after vs. before 
Genette), but "point of view" is still the object of many English stylisticians and critical 
linguisticians (Fowler Linguistks and the Novel, LinguisticCritwism.Leech-Short,Simpson) who 
are evidently aware of Genette's distinction. 
4. The implied author figure is also rejected by Genette, but the inevitability of the narrator-
author figure controlling everything makes Chatman (Characters andNarrators 195) remind that 
heterodiegetic narrators, often identified as focalizers, do not see or perceive the stories: they 
simply nárrate them. 
5. These difficulties are weü reflected a few lines later: "I shall refer to the relations between 
the elements presented and the visión through which they are presented with the term focalization. 
Focalization is, then, the relation between the visión and that which is 'seen,' perceived." 
Significantly enough, in the Spanish edition the term "visión" appears as "concepción." 
6. This category recalls the also ambiguous notion of "importance," in which intensional and 
extensional approaches are also opposed. Shen offers a clear revisión of the tradition. 
7. Strict comparison is impossible: labels are used with different degrees of precisión and 
different positions, and uncertain equivalences are suggested. Besides, there are specific problems: 
the absence of an explicit "ideological" label in some authors (Chatman, Fowler Linguistics and 
the Novel, Bal) makes uncertain the applicability of the "conceptual" and"attitude" labels to cover 
this theoretical space. Fowler's "attitude" can be assigned to the ideological dimensión, but no 
analogous extensión can be applied to Bal's psychological perception. The extensión of Chatman's 
"conceptual" área to encompass the ideological one is unclear. Simpson (43) suggests that "spatio-
temporal point of view ... might be more appropriately regarded as a subsystem of point of view 
on the psychological plañe." 
8. Bal's practical examples and analyses of focalization reveal a predilection for "visual" 
perception and taxonomic precisión: in the revisión of levéis of focalization the most complex 
particular example identified - ambiguous focalization - does not go beyond a very factual remark 
from a text by Chekhov (1977, 119). When a higher degree of interiorization is shown in the 
examples for analysis, in the section on the focalized, we are told about different degrees of 
interpretative activities on the part of focalizers, but the texts are relatively simple, since both are 
consistently written in a method of internal focalization. The other analytical "anomaly" in the 
model is double focalization, which always tends to confusingly combine perceptual and 
psychological restrictions. 
9. The importance of this axis (internal/external) parallels one problem recently denounced 
by Dolezel, who detects "a dualism typical of traditional narratology: action is in the physical 
domain, character is a set of mental properties (traits, dispositions). In other words, narrative 
structure is split into physical story and psychological personage" (Thematics ofMotivation 62). 
This dualism is also present in the institution of two narrative traditions - action-based and 
character-based (Chatman Story and Discourse 118). This dichotomy, however, is far from 
balanced, as the Aristotelian inspiration of narratological studies gives primacy to plot; in turn, this 
favours treatments of point of view based on knowledge of facts and the articulation of narrative 
sequences on the logic of suspense. 
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10. Some representative instances are, in an order of decreasing generality, Kintsch-Van Dijk, 
Van Dijk on the general foundations of text comprehension; Harker, Cupchik, Dixon et al., Giora-
Shen, and Gerrig-Bernardo on several aspects of literary processing and interpretation; Haberlandt-
Graesser and Kintsch on knowledge and its components in discourse comprehension; Graesser et 
al. on inferences in narrative text comprehension. The arguments against these approaches are 
comparable to those used by Green to attack some applications of pragmatics to literature in 
general. 
11. The psychological approach to the literary could more substantially benefit from some 
applications of genuinely psychological studies on human acting, as Dolezel's application of "a 
neobehavioristic taxonomy of motivations" (sensory, curiosity, affíliative, aggressive, 
achievement, power, and independence systems) (Thematics of Motivation 60). This is used to 
elabórate a preliminary Iist of possible thematizations of human action in narrative. 
12. But, as Simpson comments: "It is worth adding that verbs which represent straightforward 
mental processes do not defacto constitute part of the perception modal system. Statements of the 
sort / saw the game or /heard the noise are simply categorical assertions presenting observations 
on the part of the speaker" (51). 
13. This does nol depend on the grammatical person (first/third) chosen, because even in 
homodiegetic narration there is not identity between the subjectivities of the protagonist and the 
narrator; homodiegetic narration in the present is the only technique that precludes the splitting 
of the identity of the character-narrator. 
14. The only tool that could handle the combination of focalizations, as we saw in the previous 
section, is a blend of semantic and psychological analysis that would produce means of describing 
mental operations and their formal articulation. 
15. The notion of transí tion could be instrumental in the description of the combined, "impure" 
practices I have shown, but this possibility does not theoretically preclude the necessity of 
identifying the many classes of focalization that could improve the ideal of a simple narratorial-
reflector dichotomy. Besides, very long texts are normally defined as internal or external, without 
any general rule explicitly prescribing how one mode "dominates" (a quantitative method?). 
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